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CHARLES  SUMNER 

AND 

THE  TEEATY  OF  WASHINGTON 

BY  / 

DANIEL  HENRY  CHAMBERLAIN,  LL.  D. 

Resident  Member  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society^  etc.,  etc.,  etc. 


A Review  of  parts  of  An  Address 
by  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams 
before  the  New  York 
Historical  Society 
November  19 
1901 


Sed  veteris  proverhii  admonitu  vivorum  memini,  nec  tamen 
Epicuri  licet  oblivisci 

Cicero,  de  Finibus,  V.  1.  3 

I cannot  set  my  authority  against  their  authority.  But  to 
exert  reason  is  not  to  revolt  against  authority 

Burke,  Letter  on  a Regicide  Peace 


printeD  at  Mttiersfioe  press 

Por  Sale  by 

W.  B.  CLARKE  COMPANY 
Park  Street  Church 
BOSTON 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016  with  funding  from 

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CHARLES  SUMNER 


AND  THE 


TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON 


In  November,  1901,  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams 
delivered  in  New  York  city,  before  the  New  York 
Historical  Society,  an  address,  since  published  by 
the  Society,  under  the  title,  “ Before  and  After  the 
Treaty  of  Washington  : The  American  Civil  War 
and  the  War  of  the  Transvaal.”  This  address  was 
a little  later  repeated  in  Boston  in  four  lectures  be- 
fore the  Lowell  Institute.^  The  theme,  in  Mr. 
Adams’s  hands,  is  a broad  one,  as  well  as  one  of 
high  interest  and  importance,  which  Mr.  Adams 
does  not  overrate,  and  it  need  not  be  said  that  it 
was  treated  by  him  with  great  ability  and  graphic 
force.  The  address  is  filled  with  strong  expressions 
of  opinion  and  marked  by  the  utmost  freedom  of 
comment  on  men  and  events  brought  under  review. 
Naturally,  almost  unavoidably,  among  the  topics 
discussed  at  length  is  that  of  the  relations  of 
Charles  Sumner  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington. 
Intimating  that  he  is  using,  to  some  extent,  un- 
published material,  — material  not  found  in  news- 

1 Accurate  and  full  reports  of  the  lectures  appeared  in  the  Bos- 
ton Evening  Transcript  of  December  4,  7,  11,  and  14,  1901. 


2 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


papers,  public  archives,  or  memoirs  which  have 
already  seen  the  light,”  ^ and  styling  the  Treaty  of 
Washington  a very  memorable  historical  event,” 
and  President  Grant,  Secretary  Fish,  Senator  Sum- 
ner, and  Minister  Motley  great  historic  figures,” 
Mr.  Adams  deals  at  length  with  all  the  leading 
persons  and  topics  covered  by  his  theme.  Nowhere 
else  can  now  be  found  so  full,  vivid,  and  thorough 
treatment  of  this  large  and  influential  chapter  of 
our  history  as  Mr.  Adams  here  gives. 

The  purpose  of  the  present  writer,  however,  is 
closely  limited  to  an  examination  of  Mr.  Adams’s 
views  of  Senator  Sumner’s  relations  to  the  Treaty 
of  Washington,  especially  the  matter  of  his  removal 
from  the  chairmanship  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  in  March,  1871. 

It  would  probably  be  safe  to  say  that  the  public 
had,  till  Mr.  Adams  spoke,  remained  fully  per- 
suaded that  the  cause  of  Sumner’s  removal  was  his 
opposition,  and  what  grew  out  of  that  opposition,  to 
the  San  Domingo  Treaty  in  1870.  This  cause  has, 
however,  never  looked  well  on  the  historical  page, 
and  the  partisans  and  friends  of  Grant  and  Fish 
have  not  been  willing  to  stand  on  it.  The  reason 
specially  assigned,  both  in  the  senatorial  caucus 
which  decreed  the  removal  and  in  the  Senate  where 
it  was  effected,  was  the  personal  relations  of  Sum- 
ner to  Grant  and  Fish,  which  were  then  described 
as  those  of  non-recognition  and  non-speaking  in 
1 Adams,  Before  and  After,  etc.,  1. 


AND  THE  TKEATY  OF  WASHINGTON  3 


social  or  unofficial  life.  These  relations,  whatever 
of  unpleasantness  they  involved,  grew  out  of  the 
disagreement  between  Grant  and  Fish  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Sumner  on  the  other,  regarding  a treaty 
for  the  annexation  of  San  Domingo,  negotiated  by 
Grant  by  extraordinary  methods  and  sent  to  the 
Senate  in  1870.  This  treaty  Sumner  opposed,  and 
it  was  defeated  in  the  Senate,  June  30,  1870. 
Motley,  who  was  an  old  and  special  friend  of  Sum- 
ner, was  the  next  day  asked  to  resign  his  position 
as  Minister  to  England,  an  act  which  has  been 
almost  universally  regarded  as  a blow  at  Sumner, 
followed,  as  it  was,  by  a despatch  signed  by  Fish, 
which,  in  its  style  and  in  its  references  to  Sumner, 
far  overpassed  the  bounds  of  ordinary  diplomatic 
propriety.  Of  the  real  motive  of  the  removal  of 
Motley,  Mr.  Adams  thus  speaks : — 

‘‘  He  (Grant)  consequently  regarded  this  action  (op- 
position to  the  San  Domingo  Treaty)  on  the  part  of  the 
Senator  at  the  head  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, as  during  the  war  he  would  have  regarded  the 
action  of  a department  commander  who  refused  to  co- 
operate in  the  plan  of  general  campaign  laid  down  from 
headquarters  and  exerted  himself  to  cause  an  operation 
to  fail.  Such  a subordinate  should  be  summarily  re- 
lieved. He  seems  actually  to  have  chafed  under  his  in- 
ability to  take  this  course  with  the  chairman  of  a Senate 
Committee  ; and  so  he  relieved  his  feelings  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  friend  of  that  chairman,  the  Minister  to 
England,  who  was  within  his  power.  Him  he  incon- 
tinently dismissed.”  ^ 

1 Adams,  Before  and  After y etc.,  118. 


4 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


This  is  a succinct  as  well  as  an  accurate  summary 
of  the  proceeding.  It  is  not  necessary  in  the  pre- 
sent discussion  to  notice  further  the  Motley  affair. 

Evidently  ill  at  ease  regarding  the  reason  assigned 
at  the  time  for  Sumner’s  removal,  Grant  in  1877, 
six  years  after  the  removal  and  three  years  after 
Sumner’s  death,  in  two  interviews,  one  in  Scotland, 
and  the  other  at  Cairo ; and  Fish  in  the  same  year, 
in  several  newspaper  letters  and  interviews,  put 
forward,  as  the  ground  of  the  removal,  dereliction 
of  duty  on  Sumner’s  part  in  failing  to  report  in 
due  time  several  treaties  sent  to  the  Senate  and 
there  referred  to  Sumner’s  committee  during  the 
session  following  the  removal  of  Motley.  Into  this 
phase  of  the  controversy  it  is  not  necessary  to  go 
farther  than  to  say  that  friends  of  Sumner  pro- 
cured the  removal  of  secrecy  from  the  Senate  re- 
cords covering  the  period  named,  the  last  year  of 
Sumner’s  service  as  chairman,  and  the  charge  of 
neglect  of  duty  as  specified  by  Grant  and  Fish  was 
shown  to  be  wholly  unfounded. 

In  January,  1878,  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis,  who 
had  been  one  of  Fish’s  assistant  secretaries,  ap- 
peared in  an  elaborate  letter  in  the  New  York 
Herald}  in  which,  after  again  putting  forward  the 
disproved  charge  of  neglect  of  duty  on  Sumner’s 
part,  he  brought  out,  for  the  first  time,  so  far  as 
the  present  writer  has  discovered,  a certain  memo- 
randum which  he  alleged  was  sent  by  Sumner  to 
Fish,  January  17,  1871,  by  which  he  claimed  that 
1 New  York  Herald^  Jan.  4,  1878. 


AND  THE  TKEATY  OF  WASHINGTON  5 


Sumner  put  himself  in  entire  opposition  to  any  pos- 
sible settlement  of  the  pending  controversy  between 
England  and  the  United  States  growing  out  of  our 
Civil  War.  It  does  not  appear  that  this  memo- 
randum, as  exploited  by  Davis,  was  effective  to 
change  the  general  judgment  upon  the  cause  or 
merits  of  Sumner’s  removal,  or  indeed  that  it  has 
ever  hitherto  attracted  much  attention  in  any  quar- 
ter. Now,  however,  thirty  years  after  the  event, 
Mr.  Adams  takes  up  the  theme,  and  while  not  as- 
serting that  the  fact  of  this  memorandum,  or  any 
other  of  the  reasons  given  for  Sumner’s  removal, 
was  the  real  reason  moving  Grant  and  Fish  and 
the  Senators,  does  assert,  in  round  terms,  that  this 
memorandum  of  January  17,  1871,  made  it  justifi- 
able, necessary,  and  right  for  the  Administration, 
if  it  could  do  so,  to  secure  the  removal  of  Sumner 
from  the  head  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations.  Referring  to  Sumner’s  removal,  Mr. 
Adams  says  : — 

Under  these  circumstances  the  course  now  pursued 
(the  removal  of  Sumner)  was  more  than  justifiable.  It 
was  necessary  as  well  as  right.”  ^ 

What  the  circumstances  were  will  fully  appear 
hereafter. 

The  present  question  is  : Must  we  revise  our 
opinion  of  Sumner  so  far  as  to  think  that  the  re- 
moval was  just  and  warranted  on  the  grounds  on 
which  Mr.  Adams  puts  it  ? 

1 Adams,  Before  and  After ^ etc.,  128. 


6 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


It  should  be  said  at  once  that  Mr.  Adams  is  not 
to  be  ranked  with  the  enemies  of  Sumner.  Neither 
in  Sumner’s  lifetime  nor  since  has  Mr.  Adams’s  at- 
titude towards  him  been  unfriendly  or  disparaging. 
If  not  a special  admirer  or  eulogist,  he  has  been 
and  is  now  wholly  unmoved  by  any  feeling,  as  we 
may  well  believe,  except  that  of  historical  justice 
and  truth.  Grant  obviously  became  vindictively 
hostile  to  Sumner ; and  Fish,  as  the  friend  and 
subordinate  of  Grant,  was  actively  and  willingly 
hostile ; but  Mr.  Adams  comes  forward  as  an  im- 
partial, cold  student  of  history,  and  has  no  interest 
or  prejudice  adverse  to  Sumner.  His  judgment 
is  therefore  weighty,  and  must  have  consideration. 
It  compels  the  reexamination  of  a controversy 
which  is  at  once  complicated  and  painful,  — pain- 
ful in  many  aspects,  — but  one  which  touches  the 
fame  of  a lofty  name  in  our  annals.  Those,  how- 
ever, who  would  guard  the  memory  of  Sumner  are 
not,  on  that  account,  to  be  rated  as  enemies  of 
Grant  or  Fish.  They  wish  only,  it  should  be  as- 
sumed, to  see  justice  done  to  all,  injustice  to  none. 

Recalling,  then,  that  in  April,  1869,  Grant  was 
President,  Fish,  Secretary  of  State,  Sumner,  Chair- 
man of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, and  Motley,  Minister  to  England,  it  should 
now  be  said  that  Sumner  had  held  his  post  con- 
tinuously since  the  reorganization  of  the  Senate 
committees  on  the  retirement  of  the  Secession 
Senators  in  1861,  and,  it  is  superfluous  to  add,  was 
better  qualified  for  the  position  than  any  other 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  7 


Senator,  if  not  any  other  man  in  the  country.  Mot- 
ley was,  of  all  Americans  then  living  and  available, 
generally  regarded  the  fittest  to  represent  his  coun- 
try at  the  English  capital. 

Another  event  must  here  be  noted  as  part  of  the 
tangled  web  of  circumstances  which  envelops  the 
controversy  now  under  examination.  The  treaty 
known  as  the  Johnson-Clarendon  Convention  for 
the  settlement  of  the  Alabama  claims  against  Eng- 
land had  been  signed  in  January,  1869,  during  the 
presidency  of  Andrew  J ohnson ; but  action  on  it  by 
the  Senate  had  been  postponed  until  after  the  acces- 
sion of  Grant.  While  this  treaty  was  under  discus- 
sion in  the  Senate,  Sumner,  in  April,  1869,  opposed 
it  in  a speech  in  which  he  set  forth  at  length  the  un- 
friendly course  of  England  during  our  Civil  War 
and  the  vast  pecuniary  injuries  thereby  done  to  our 
nation  as  well  as  to  individuals.  It  must  be  said 
here,  peremptorily  and  once  for  all,  that  this  famous 
speech  was  not  a demand  for  pecuniary  reparation 
for  national  injuries,  as  has  been  so  persistently  re- 
presented, though  not  by  Mr.  Adams.  It  was  a pre- 
sentation or  statement  of  injuries  done ; and  it  was 
a true  presentation.  It  went  in  no  respect  beyond 
the  positions  previously  taken  by  our  government 
through  Lincoln,  Seward,  and  Minister  Adams, 
during  the  war  and  at  its  close.  The  injuries  done 
were  simply  put  by  this  speech  before  the  country, 
before  England,  and  before  the  world,  as  the  actual 
relations  of  the  parties.  They  were  presented  not 
as  assessable  claims  or  demands,  but  as  matters  to 


8 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


be  known  and  considered  as  parts  of  the  situation ; 
parts  of  England’s  misconduct  towards  our  coun- 
try ; parts  of  our  grievance  against  England.  And 
it  should  here  be  added  that  these  considerations 
— considerations  rather  than  claims  — were  after- 
wards perverted  into  pecuniary  demands  by  Grant 
and  Fish,  and  formulated  as  such  by  Fish  and 
Davis,  in  an  offensive  manner,  in  what  is  known  as 
our  Case  ” at  the  Geneva  Arbitration, — a course 
of  conduct  for  which  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis  is  be- 
lieved to  be  largely,  if  not  mainly,  responsible, 
nearly  costing  us  the  loss  of  the  settlement  made 
by  the  Treaty  of  Washington.  It  may  be  af- 
firmed, too,  that  Sumner’s  speech,  when  made,  was 
approved  by  the  entire  country,  and  by  Grant  and 
Fish.  The  evidence  of  Grant’s  and  Fish’s  ap- 
proval seems  clear,  but  it  cannot  be  given  in  detail 
here.  Afterwards,  Grant  and  Fish,  together  with 
Davis  and  other  defenders  of  Grant  and  Fish,  set 
up  that  this  speech  was  unfortunate  and  embarrass- 
ing to  the  Administration,  was  made  without  con- 
sultation with  Grant  or  Fish,  and  was  highly  dis- 
approved by  them  at  the  time. 

The  San  Domingo  Treaty  and  the  Johnson- 
Clarendon  Convention  being  thus  rejected,  the  re- 
sults being  the  removal  of  Motley,  the  gross  and 
carefully  studied  insult  to  Sumner  by  Fish  in  the 
despatch  already  referred  to,  and  the  keen  personal 
hostility  of  Grant  to  Sumner ; the  matter  of  this  dis- 
cussion is  now  brought  down  to  J anuary,  1871,  when 
negotiations  were  begun  at  Washington  between 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  9 


Fish  and  Sir  John  Rose,  special  confidential  agent 
of  the  British  government,  for  the  settlement  of  the 
existing  grievances  and  claims  of  the  United  States 
against  Great  Britain.  These  negotiations  shortly- 
resulted  in  a memorandum  outlining  a plan  of 
settlement,  submitted  by  Sir  John  Rose  to  Fish  on 
January  11,  1871.  At  this  stage  Fish  wished  to 
consult  Sumner,  and  finding  upon  inquiry  that 
Sumner,  in  spite  of  his  deeply  felt  personal  griev- 
ance, was  ready  to  confer  with  him  on  public 
business,  he  met  Sumner  at  the  ^ latter’s  house, 
January  15,  and  after  conference  left  with  Sumner 
the  memorandum  of  Sir  John  Rose  for  his  further 
consideration.  Two  days  later,  on  the  17th  of 
January,  1871,  Sumner  gave  to  Fish  in  writing 
his  views  on  the  memorandum  of  Sir  John  Rose, 
now  reported  to  have  been,  in  form  and  terms,  as 
follows : — 

MEMORANDUM  FOR  MR.  FISH,  IN  REPLY  TO  HIS 
INQUIRIES. 

First.  — The  idea  of  Sir  John  Rose  is  that  all  ques- 
tions and  causes  of  irritation  between  England  and  the 
United  States  should  he  removed  absolutely  and  forever, 
that  we  may  be  at  peace  really,  and  good  neighbors,  and 
to  this  end  all  points  of  difference  should  be  considered 
together.  Nothing  could  be  better  than  this  initial  idea. 
It  should  be  the  starting-point. 

“ Second.  — The  greatest  trouble,  if  not  peril,  being 
a constant  source  of  anxiety  and  disturbance,  is  from 
Fenianism,  which  is  excited  by  the  proximity  of  the 
British  flag  in  Canada.  Therefore,  the  withdrawal  of 


10 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


the  British  flag  cannot  be  abandoned  as  a condition  or 
preliminary  of  such  a settlement  as  is  now  proposed. 
To  make  the  settlement  complete,  the  withdrawal  should 
be  from  this  hemisphere,  including  provinces  and 
islands. 

‘‘  Third,  — No  proposition  for  a joint  commission  can 
be  accepted  unless  the  terms  of  submission  are  such  as 
to  leave  no  reasonable  doubt  of  a favorable  result. 
There  must  not  be  another  failure. 

“ Fourth,  — A discrimination  in  favor  of  claims  aris- 
ing from  the  depredations  of  any  particular  ship  will  dis- 
honor the  claims  ^arising  from  the  depredations  of  other 
ships,  which  the  American  Government  cannot  afford  to 
do ; nor  should  the  English  Government  expect  it,  if 
they  would  sincerely  remove  all  occasions  of  difference. 

C.  S.’’ 

January  17,  1871.” 

Holding  in  mind  the  facts  now  presented,  we  can 
clearly  perceive  the  situation  of  the  parties  with 
reference  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  and  dis- 
cuss their  conduct.  Mr.  Adams  finds  in  this  memo- 
randum of  Sumner  the  ground  on  which  he  reaches 
the  conclusion  that  Sumner’s  removal  was  not  only 
warranted,  but  necessary  and  right;  right  — it  is 
to  be  supposed  he  means  — in  all  senses  of  the 
word. 

Mr.  Adams  expresses  great  surprise  that  Mr. 
Pierce,  in  his  ‘‘  Life  of  Sumner,”  has  not  given 
the  text  of  Sumner’s  memorandum  of  January  17, 
1871.  Dwelling  at  some  length  on  the  amplitude 
of  Mr.  Pierce’s  “ Life  of  Sumner,”  he  says : — 

“ The  most  remarkable  and  highly  characteristic 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  11 


memorandum  just  quoted  is  expressed  in  about  220 
words ; and  yet  for  it  Mr.  Pierce  found  no  space  in  his 
four  massive  volumes.  He  refers  to  it,  indeed,  showing 
that  he  was  aware  of  its  existence ; but  he  does  so 
briefly,  and  somewhat  lightly ; treating  it  as  a matter  of 
small  moment,  and  no  significance.”  ^ 

Mr.  Adams  is  less  than  accurate  in  saying  that 
Mr.  Pierce  treats  the  memorandum  briefly  or 
lightly ; for  in  his  fourth  volume,  after  noticing  it 
at  pp.  480,  481,  he  gives  it  full  consideration  at 
pp.  634-638.  He  does  not  give  the  text  of  the 
memorandum,  for  the  reason,  as  it  may  easily  be 
believed,  that  he  had  no  copy  of  it.  It  was  a con- 
fidential, informal,  unofficial  communication  of 
Sumner  to  Fish,  a mere  memorandum  signed  only 
by  the  initials  “ C.  S.,”  and  it  seems  natural  and 
altogether  probable  that  Sumner  kept  no  copy,  and 
therefore  that  no  copy  came  into  the  hands  of  Mr. 
Pierce  as  his  authorized  biographer.  It  is  not 
incredible,  too,  that  Mr.  Pierce  felt  that  the  memo- 
randum, as  given  out  by  Davis,  lacked  evidence  of 
authenticity.  At  p.  637  Mr.  Pierce  says  : Mr. 

Davis  assumes  to  give  the  terms  of  Mr.  Sumner’s 
memorandum  of  January  17,  1871.  Taking  it  as 
given,  etc.”  — language  which  suggests  possible 
doubt  in  Mr.  Pierce’s  mind  of  the  genuineness 
or  correctness  of  the  memorandum  as  given  by 
Davis. 

Well  might  Mr.  Pierce,  well  might  any  one  now, 
pause  long  before  such  doubt ; for  the  contents  of 
1 Adams,  Before  and  After,  etc.,  100,  101. 


12 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


the  memorandum  are  not  half  so  ‘‘  astounding,”  to 
use  Mr.  Adams’s  word,  as  are  the  time,  manner, 
and  purpose  of  its  first  production  by  Davis,  — 
seven  years  after  its  date,  four  years  after  Sum- 
ner’s death,  and  in  a last  ^attempt  to  shift  the  de- 
fence of  Grant  and  Fish  to  more  tenable  ground. 
The  quarrel  or  controversy  of  Grant  and  Fish  with 
Sumner  was  determined  and  strenuous,  especially 
in  1871,  and  during  Sumner’s  lifetime.  Why  was 
not  this  memorandum  disclosed  then  ? Or,  if  there 
was  delicacy  or  danger,  as  Davis  hints,  in  making 
it  known  while  negotiations  were  in  progi*es^j|Vhy 
at  least  was  it  not  disclosed  after  the  Treaty  of 
Washington  had  been  signed,  ratified,  and  carried 
into  final  effect?  Why  especially,  when  in  1877, 
six  years  after  its  date  and  three  years  after  Sum- 
ner’s death,  Fish  was  giving  out  self-exculpatory 
letters  and  interviews,  and  Grant  in  the  same  year 
was  putting  forward  the  new  excuse  of  Sumner’s 
neglect  of  duty,  was  no  allusion  made  to  this 
memorandum,  or  to  any  other  action  or  position  of 
Sumner  which  hindered  or  embarrassed,  or  threat- 
ened to  hinder  or  embarrass,  the  negotiation  of  the 
Treaty  of  Washington?  In  all  this  anxious  cast- 
ing about  for  a better  defence,  why  did  not  this 
memorandum  then  come  to  mind  ? Such  questions 
called  for  answer ; and  being  unanswered,  they 
certainly  warranted  some  degree  of  doubt  of  the 
authenticity  of  the  memorandum,  — at  least  until 
it  appeared  in  a government  publication  in  1895, 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  13 


from  which  it  may  be  supposed  that  Mr.  Adams 
took  it.^ 

Davis,  in  his  elaborate  defence  of  Fish  in  the 
New  York  Herald  letter,  impliedly  states  that  the 
contents  of  Sumner’s  memorandum  were  privately 
made  known  to  Senators  at  the  time  of  Sumner’s 
removal ; and  he  says  that  he  had  then  no  doubt, 
and  has  since  had  no  reason  to  doubt,  that  the  sub- 
stitution of  Mr.  Cameron  for  Mr.  Sumner  was  the 
practical  answer  of  the  leading  Kepublican  mem- 
bers (Senators)  to  the  manifesto  of  the  17th  of 
January.”  ^ Here  we  have  Davis  claiming  that  the 
knowledge  of  this  memorandum  by  Senators  was  the 
cause  of  Sumner’s  removal,  though  in  the  next  sen- 
tence but  one  of  his  letter  he  confesses  that  the  rea- 
son given  for  the  removal  — to  whom  given  he  does 
not  say  — was  that  Mr.  Sumner  was  not  on  speak- 
ing terms  with  the  President  and  with  Mr.  Fish.” 
Does  any  sane  man  believe  that  if  such  a reason  as 
Sumner’s  memorandum,  interpreted  as  Davis  then, 
and  Mr.  Adams  now,  interprets  it,  was  in  the  minds 
of  Senators  when  the  removal  took  place,  it  would 
never  have  been  hinted  at  by  any  one  in  the  extreme 
stress  of  the  debates  of  Senators  in  caucus,  and  in 
the  Senate  ? Or  can  any  one  conceive  it  possible 
that  if  such  a reason  was  known  and  controlling, 
and  if  all  allusion  to  it  had  been  for  any  reason 
suppressed  at  that  time,  it  would  never  have  come 

1 House  Misc.  Docs.,  1893-94,  xxxix.  525;  Inter naU  ArhiU 
(Moore). 

2 Davis,  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Ala.  Claims,  139. 


14 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


to  the  public  knowledge  after  all  occasion  for  con- 
cealment was  past,  after  the  treaty  was  made  and 
executed,  and  until  long  after  Sumner’s  death? 
In  the  Senate,  April  28, 1874,  more  than  two  years 
after  the  treaty  had  been  carried  into  effect,  three 
years  after  Sumner’s  removal,  and  more  than  a 
month  after  his  death,  discussion  regarding  the  re- 
moval again  broke  out,  but  though  the  leading 
supporters  of  the  removal  struggled  hard  to  put 
the  best  possible  face  on  it,  no  remotest  reference 
was  made  to  Sumner’s  memorandum  of  January 
17,  1871,  nor  to  any  other  act  of  hindrance  or  op- 
position on  his  part  to  the  negotiations  for  the 
Treaty  of  Washington.  The  conclusion  must  be 
that  Sumner’s  memorandum,  wliatever  else  it  did, 
did  not  play  any  part  in  the  minds  of  Senators  in 
securing  Sumner’s  removal ; and  that  grave  doubt 
of  its  genuineness  might  reasonably  have  been  felt 
when  it  was  put  out  by  Davis,  for  the  first  time,  in 
1878.  Mr.  Adams  does  not  seem  to  give  any  heed 
to  this  memorandum  as  influencing  Senators.  As 
to  the  removal  of  Sumner  he  says : — 

The  step  taken  (the  removal  of  Sumner)  was  one 
almost  without  precedent,  and  there  is  every  reason  to 
conclude  that  it  had  been  decided  upon  in  the  private 
councils  of  the  White  House  quite  irrespective  of  the 
fate  of  any  possible  treaty  which  might  result  from  the 
negotiations  then  in  progress.”  ^ 

Such  must  be  the  conclusion  of  any  impartial 
1 Adams,  Before  and  After ^ etc.,  127. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  15 


mind  upon  consideration  of  what  has  now  been 
stated. 

But  the  more  serious  question,  the  real  question, 
remains : Was  the  memorandum  of  January  17, 
1871,  of  itself  a good  cause  for  the  removal,  on 
the  demand  of  the  President?  The  Senate,  ac- 
cording to  Mr.  Adams,  merely  registered  the  decree 
of  the  White  House;  the  removal  had  really  no 
reference  to  any  treaty ; General  Grant  was  merely 
“ now  handling  a campaign,”  and  — this  is  Mr. 
Adams’s  language  — “ so  far  as  the  Chairman  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  was 
concerned,  the  man  of  Donelson,  of  Vicksburg, 
and  of  Appomattox  now  had  his  eye  coldly  fixed 
on  him,”  and  ‘‘with  his  opponent  and  objective 
clear  to  him,  he  shaped  his  plan  of  operations 
accordingly.”  ^ 

The  sole  point  in  Sumner’s  memorandum  which 
needs  now  to  be  considered,  because  it  is  the  sole 
point  discussed  by  Mr.  Adams,  is  its  second  para- 
graph, in  these  words  : — 

“ Second.  — The  greatest  trouble,  if  not  peril,  being  a 
constant  source  of  anxiety  and  disturbance,  is  from 
Fenianism,  which  is  excited  by  the  proximity  of  the 
British  flag  in  Canada.  Therefore,  the  withdrawal  of 
the  British  flag  cannot  be  abandoned  as  a condition  or 
preliminary  of  such  a settlement  as  is  now  proposed. 
To  make  the  settlement  complete,  the  withdrawal  should 
be  from  this  hemisphere,  including  provinces  and  is- 
lands.” 

^ Adams,  Before  and  After ^ etc.,  124,  126. 


16 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


It  is  well  here  to  observe  how  wide  asunder 
Davis  and  Mr.  Adams  are  in  their  views  of  the 
first  effect  of  the  memorandum  upon  Fish  and 
Grant.  Davis  says : ‘‘  I well  remember  Mr.  Fish’s 
astonishment  when  he  received  it.  At  first  he  al- 
most thought  any  attempt  at  negotiations  would 
prove  futile.”  ^ But  Mr.  Adams  says,  after  a care- 
ful review  of  the  situation  as  it  then  was  : — 

When  received  it  (Sumner’s  memorandum)  could 
have  occasioned  Mr.  Fish  no  special  wonder  ; except, 
perhaps,  in  its  wide  inclusiveness,  it  suggested  nothing 
new,  nothing  altogether  beyond  the  pale  of  reasonable 
expectation,  much  less  of  discussion.  It  brought  no 
novel  consideration  into  debate.”  ^ 

Nothing  in  Mr.  Adams’s  address  is  more  inter- 
esting, or  illuminating,  or  important,  than  his  ex- 
amination of  this  point.  As  results,  he  shows  that 
Sumner  had  long  regarded  the  not  remote  with- 
drawal of  England  from  this  continent  and  hemi- 
sphere as  the  logical  development  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.”  Mr.  Adams  further  shows  that  from 
1840  to  1870  and  later.  Great  Britain  herself  looked 
upon  her  colonies  as  a burden,  a source  of  weakness 
and  not  a source  of  strength.  He  further  shows 
that  Fish  had  repeatedly,  before  1871  and  as  late 
as  September,  1870,  sounded  and  pressed  Sir  Ed- 
ward Thornton,  the  British  Minister  at  Washing- 
ton, on  the  subject  of  the  cession  of  Canada,  “ the 
American  claims  on  Great  Britain  being  too  large 

^ Davis,  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Ala.  Claimsy  137. 

2 Adams,  Before  and  After y etc.,  101,  102. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  17 


to  admit  o£  money  settlement ; ” and  that  Sir  Ed- 
ward Thornton  had  replied  that  “ England  had  no 
wish  to  keep  Canada,  but  could  not  part  with  it 
without  the  consent  of  the  population.”  Again 
Mr.  Adams  represents  Sir  Edward  Thornton  as 
saying  to  Fish  in  terms,  in  reference  to  the  cession 
of  Canada : “ It  is  impossible  for  Great  Britain  to 
inaugurate  a separation.  They  are  willing,  and 
even  anxious,  to  have  one ; ” and  Thornton  pro- 
ceeds to  give  the  reasons.  Mr.  Adams  also  shows 
that  “ not  only  at  this  time  (1869)  but  long  after, 
was  a comprehensive  settlement  on  this  basis  (the 
cession  of  Canada)  urged  on  the  British  govern- 
ment ” by  our  government ; and  that  “ both  the 
President  and  Secretary  of  State  were  thus  of  one 
mind  with  Mr.  Sumner.”  Mr.  Adams  goes  on  to 
adduce  proofs  of  the  willingness  of  Great  Britain 
to  consider  the  cession  of  Canada  in  the  settlement 
of  our  claims  and  grievances,  and  of  Grant’s  lively 
eagerness  to  negotiate  on  that  basis.  In  connec- 
tion with  this  he  states  the  very  remarkable  fact 
that  Grant,  late  in  1869,  expressed  his  unwilling- 
ness to  adjust  the  claims  (against  Great  Britain)  ; 
he  wished  them  kept  open  until  Great  Britain  was 
ready  to  give  up  Canada.”  Mr.  Adams  further 
says  that  the  English  Mission,  after  Motley’s  re- 
moval, was  offered  to  O.  P.  Morton,  who  entertained 
the  offer ; that  Grant  then  proposed  that  the  new 
Minister  should  attempt  a negotiation  based  on  the 
following  concessions  by  Great  Britain : (1)  The 
payment  of  actual  losses  incurred  through  the  de- 


18 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


predations  of  British  Confederate  commerce-de- 
stroyers ; (2)  a satisfactory  revision  of  the  princi- 
ples of  international  law  as  between  the  two  na- 
tions ; and  (3)  the  submission  to  the  voters  of  the 
Dominion  of  the  question  of  independence,”  — in- 
dependence meaning  of  course,  in  Grant’s  mind, 
annexation.^ 

This  part  of  Mr.  Adams’s  address  is  a revelation 
which  deserves  the  attention  of  all  who  love  to 
consider  great  questions  of  state. 

In  view  of  these  feelings  both  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain  and  of  Grant,  Mr.  Adams  declares : 

“ Sumner  certainly  had  grounds  for  assuming  that 
a not  unwilling  hemispheric  flag-withdrawal  by  Great 
Britain  was  more  than  probable  in  the  early  future.”  ^ 

He  says  further : — 

‘‘Up  to  this  point  (1870)  the  Chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  the  President,  the  Sec- 
retary of  State,  and  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  gener- 
ally had  gone  on  in  happy  concurrence.  They  had  the 
same  end  in  view.  . . . Thus  far  . . . the  two  ques- 
tions of  a settlement  of  claims  and  Canadian  independ- 
ence (that  is,  independence  from  England,  to  be  followed 
by  annexation  to  the  United  States)  had  been  kept 
closely  associated.”  ^ 

Now  came  a change ; but,  Mr.  Adams  says, 
“ The  change  was  gradual ; for,”  he  adds,  “ Mr. 
Sumner’s  policy  had  a strong  hold  on  the  minds  of 

^ Adams,  Before  and  After,  etc.,  103-113; 

2 Ihid.  110.  3 111. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  19 


both  President  and  Secretary.”  ^ Suddenly,  how- 
ever, Grant  and  Fish  at  last  — but  not  earlier  than 
December,  1870  — determined  to  drop  the  policy 
of  a comprehensive  settlement  ” on  the  basis  of 
the  transfer  of  Canada,  and  to  negotiate  for  the  im- 
mediate money  settlement  of  the  Alahama  claims ; 
and  thereupon,  in  a few  days.  Sir  John  Rose  ap- 
peared in  Washington,  and  another  basis  of  settle- 
ment was  formulated,  which  was  submitted,  as  has 
been  seen,  by  Fish  to  Sumner  for  his  opinion,  and 
drew  from  him  the  memorandum  of  January  17, 
1871.  Contrast  all  this  with  Davis’s  account  of  the 
shock  of  surprise  felt  by  Fish  at  sight  of  Sumner’s 
memorandum  ! If  Mr.  Adams  is  correctly  in- 
formed, it  was  Sumner  who  might  well  have  felt 
such  a shock  when  he  first  learned  on  January  15, 
1871,  of  the  abandonment  by  Grant  and  Fish  of 
their  common  policy  up  to  this  time.  If  Mr. 
Adams  is  well  advised,  Sumner,  Grant,  and  Fish 
had  held  common  views  as  to  Canada  up  to,  or 
nearly  to,  the  interview  between  Fish  and  Sumner 
on  January  15,  1871.  What  passed  at  that  inter- 
view we  are  not  told,  but  two  things  are  perfectly 
clear  ; firsts  that,  upon  Mr.  Adams’s  showing, 
Sumner  in  the  memorandum  of  January  17,  1871, 
was  merely  standing  on  the  same  ground  on  which 
he,  with  Grant  and  Fish,  had  heretofore  stood; 
and,  second^  that  Sumner  at  the  time  he  drew  his 
memorandum  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  his 
position  would  be  offensive  to  Great  Britain,  or  a 
1 Adams,  Before  and  After ^ etc.,  111. 


20 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


fatal  hindrance  to  negotiations.  Nothing  can  be 
more  important  in  considering  the  merits  of  Sum- 
ner’s memorandum  than  these  two  things.  Sum- 
ner was  not  only  adhering  to  views  long  held  by 
him  in  common  with  Grant  and  Fish,  — views  fa- 
miliar to  the  British  government  in  preceding  offi- 
cial communications  between  Fish  and  Sir  Edward 
Thornton,  — but  he  was  again  urging  and  formulat- 
ing a policy  which  he  had  reason  to  hope  would  yet 
be  accepted  by  Great  Britain,  and  which  he  had 
hitherto  known  was  approved  by  Grant  and  Fish. 
Mr.  Adams  again  expressly  says : — 

his  (Sumner’s)  memorandum,  therefore,  he  de- 
manded nothing  new  ; he  merely,  stating  the  case  in  its 
widest  form,  insisted  upon  adherence  to  a familiar  policy 
long  before  formulated.”  ^ 

It  is  worth  noticing,  too,  that  in  an  interview 
between  Fish  and  Sir  Edward  Thornton  in  March, 
1870,  Fish  pressed  upon  the  British  Minister  the 
identical  considerations  stated  in  the  second  para- 
graph of  Sumner’s  memorandum.  Mr.  Adams 
says : — 

The  Secretary  (Fish)  again  urged  on  the  Minister 
(Thornton)  that  the  American  provinces  were  to  Great 
Britain  a menace  of  danger,  and  that  a cause  of  irrita- 
tion, and  of  possible  complication,  would,  especially  in 
those  times  of  Fenianism,  be  removed  should  they  be 
made  independent.”  ^ 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  Sumner  wanted 
^ Adams,  Before  and  After,  etc.,  114.  ^ Xbid,  110. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  21 


Canada.  On  many  occasions  he  had  expressed  the 
wish  and  hope,  — but  never  except  by  peaceful 
methods,  by  the  cheerful  acquiescence  of  England 
and  Canada.  He  had  repelled  all  other  methods. 
“ Territory,”  with  his  characteristic  and  habitual 
regard  for  the  rights  of  all  men,  he  had  exclaimed 
at  Worcester  in  September,  1869,  in  discussing  the 
union  of  Canada  with  our  country,  — territory  may 
be  conveyed,  but  not  a people.”  The  man,  who- 
ever he  may  be,  who  can  think  or  claim  that  Charles 
Sumner  had  any  other  thought  in  his  mind,  under 
any  circumstances,  regarding  Canada,  than  that  of 
fair,  honorable,  peaceful,  willing  union  through  the 
free  consent  of  England  and  Canada,  may  assure 
himself  that  he  does  not  yet  know  him.  Of  all 
our  statesmen,  living  or  dead,  Sumner  was  the  most 
scrupulous,  the  least  ruthless.  He  had  great  views 
and  aspirations  for  his  country ; but  his  spirit  was 
never  aggressive  or  wanton.  Mr.  Adams  well  says : 
“ Charles  Sumner  did  not  belong  to  the  Bismarck- 
ian  school  of  statesmanship.” 

Considering  the  situation,  as  now  presented,  when 
Sumner  framed  his  memorandum,  the  questions 
arise.  What  did  its  second  paragraph  signify,  or 
what  may  it  be  certainly  affirmed  was  Sumner’s 
aim  in  submitting  the  memorandum  to  Fish,  and 
how  ought  it  to  have  been  received  and  estimated 
by  Grant  and  Fish  ? It  should  be  carefully  kept  in 
mind  at  all  times  that  the  memorandum  of  Janu- 
ary 17, 1871,  was  an  informal,  unofficial,  and  confi- 
dential communication  made  to  Fish  ; and  it  cannot 


22 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


be  imagined  that  Sumner  for  a moment  contem- 
plated as  possible  the  use  subsequently  made  of 
it,  as  we  shall  see,  by  Fish.  Was  there  at  that 
time  the  least  ground  for  believing  or  fearing  that 
Sumner  meant  by  this  memorandum  to  set  himself 
implacably  and  finally  in  the  way  of  all  negotia- 
tions except  upon  the  initial  condition  of  a cession 
of  Canada?  Plainly  not.  From  anything  yet 
disclosed,  Sumner  neither  saw  nor  had  reason  to 
believe,  when  he  wrote  his  memorandum,  that  there 
was  a necessity  for  abandoning  the  effort  to  se- 
cure by  peaceful  negotiation  the  cession  of  Canada 
and  the  withdrawal  of  Great  Britain  from  this 
continent.  He  saw,  as  we  may  safely  suppose,  by 
his  interview  with  Fish  on  January  15,  as  well  as 
by  the  memorandum  submitted  to  him  by  Fish  on 
that  occasion,  outlining  the  basis  of  settlement  as 
then  tentatively  arranged  between  Fish  and  Sir 
John  Rose,  that  the  Administration,  for  some  rea- 
son, doubtless  unknown  to  him,  had  suddenly  and 
completely  reversed  itself  upon  the  general  policy  of 
the  settlement  with  England  which  he  had  hitherto 
held  in  common  with  Grant  and  Fish.  Further  than 
this,  it  is  not  made  probable  that  he  had  the  means 
of  penetrating  the  designs  or  reasons  of  the  Ad- 
ministration. As  soon,  therefore,  as  he  carefully 
considered  the  memorandum  of  settlement  sub- 
mitted to  him  by  Fish,  he  found  no  reason  for  re- 
tiring from  the  position  theretofore  held  by  him  as 
well  as  by  the  Administration.  It  did  not  then  ap- 
pear, if  Mr.  Adams’s  information  is  correct,  that 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  23 


Great  Britain  would  regard  the  settlement,  which 
included  the  cession  of  Canada,  as  impossible.  It 
may,  indeed,  be  said  that  it  does  not  now  appear 
that  if  the  Administration  had  patiently  put  by 
the  negotiations  and  waited,  biding  its  time,  that 
result  might  not  have  been  reached.  As  to  this, 
Mr.  Adams  himself  finally  says  : — 

“ In  the  hands  and  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Sum- 
ner, the  method  he  proposed  to  pursue  to  the  end  he  had 
in  mind  might  have  proved  both  effective  and,  in  the 
close,  beneficent.”  ^ 

The  situation  at  this  moment  was  a peculiarly 
favorable  one  for  such  a policy.  It  was  the  govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain,  not  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  — let  it  not  be  forgotten,  — that  was 
now  anxious  for  a settlement.  The  British  govern- 
ment had  repeatedly  approached  our  government 
for  terms  of  settlement.  It  was  the  British  gov- 
ernment that  had  now  volunteered  to  send  its  ac- 
complished special  agent.  Sir  John  Bose,  to  Wash- 
ington to  seek  means  of  adjustment.  Mr.  Adams 
tells  us  why  England  was  so  anxious  to  settle. 
European  complications  and  perils  of  the  gravest 
kind  were  then  staring  her  in  the  face. 

Doubtless  Sumner  saw  in  all  this  not  only  no 
reason  for  abating  terms  of  settlement,  but  a most 
hopeful  opportunity  for  diplomatic  insistence  on  the 
terms  already  known  to  England,  pressed  by  the 
Administration,  and  discussed,  but  not  repelled,  by 
1 Adams,  Before  and  After , etc.,  140. 


24 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


her  Minister  at  Washington.  It  would,  therefore, 
be  first  necessary  to  show  that  there  was  danger  in 
further  insistence,  and  that  Sumner  knew,  or  ought 
to  have  known,  of  such  danger  before  he  can  be 
charged  with  deliberately  and  obstinately  taking 
up  an  impracticable,  or  unwise,  or  dangerous  posi- 
tion. From  anything  shown  by  Mr.  Adams,  no 
such  charge  will  lie  against  Sumner  on  account  of 
this  memorandum.  On  the  contrary,  Mr.  Adams 
specially  states  the  fact  that  Grant,  as  early  as 
March,  1870,  ‘^Tiad  cautioned  Fish  against  com- 
municating to  Mr.  Sumner  any  confidential  or 
important  information  received  at  the  State  De- 
partment."^^ ^ 

Another  ground  for  relieving  Sumner  from  sus- 
picion of  an  obstinate  purpose  to  hinder  any  and 
all  settlement  is  that  the  second  paragraph  of  his 
memorandum  cannot  reasonably  be  construed  as 
Sumner’s  ultimatum,  his  irreducible  minimum. 
Negotiations  had  but  just  been  begun.  The  Brit- 
ish special  agent  had  been  in  Washington  but  six 
days.  The  memorandum  of  Sir  J ohn  Rose  which 
lay  before  him  was  the  first  approach  to  a new  ba- 
sis of  settlement.  Was  it  for  Sumner,  still  holding 
in  good  faith  his  long  cherished  policy  of  coupling 
our  grievances  with  the  cession  of  Canada,  — a pol- 
icy heretofore  acted  on  by  the  Administration,  and 
specially  dear  to  Grant,  but  now  suddenly  aban- 
doned by  the  Administration,  — was  it  for  him, 
without  an  instant’s  demur  or  further  effort,  to  fol- 
^ Adams,  Before  and  After^  etc.,  111. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  25 


low  the  retreating  Administration  ? He  might  well 
have  felt  — he  probably  did  feel  — that  England’s 
anxiety  to  settle  was  his  own  country’s  golden  op- 
portunity, not  to  extort  unrighteous  terms,  but 
terms  honorable  and  advantageous,  the  most  honor- 
able and  advantageous  possible,  to  his  own  country, 
and  not  offensive  or  oppressive  to  England.  If 
Sumner  reasoned  thus,  he  reasoned  well ; he  rea- 
soned patriotically;  and  with  this  in  mind,  his 
memorandum  becomes  only  an  effort,  timely  and 
wise,  to  secure  the  most  adequate  possible  redress 
for  his  country’s  wrongs.  So  construed  and  re- 
garded, his  memorandum  of  January  17,  1871,  was 
not  impracticable,  nor  obstructive. 

And  how  did  Grant,  according  to  Mr.  Adams,  re- 
gard Sumner’s  memorandum  ? Merely  as  a strategic 
advantage  gained  over  Sumner,  whereby  to  punish 
him  for  his  audacity  in  opposing  Grant’s  San 
Domingo  enterprise.  It  would  seem  from  Mr. 
Adams  that  this  was  all  Grant  thought  of ; and  it 
also  seems  certain  that  with  his  quick  eye,”  as 
Mr.  Adams  remarks,  ‘‘for  a strategic  situation,” 
Grant  felt  exultation,  rather  than  dismay  — as 
Davis  pictures  Fish  as  feeling  — at  sight  of  Sum- 
ner’s memorandum.  Mr.  Adams  says  : — 

“ When  Secretary  Fish,  with  Sumner^s  memorandum 
in  his  hand,  went  to  Grant  for  instructions,  the  Presi- 
dent’s views  as  to  the  independence  and  annexation  of 
Canada  at  once  underwent  a change.  As  he  welcomed 
an  issue  with  his  much-disliked  antagonist  on  which  he 


26 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


felt  assured  of  victory,  hemispheric  flag-withdrawals 
ceased  to  interest  him  ; ” ^ 

— which  plainly  means  that,  in  Grant’s  view,  Sum- 
ner had  merely  blundered,  giving  him  a weapon 
which  he  could  readily  use  to  worst  one  whom  he 
had  come  greatly  to  dislike.  That  Grant  thought 
Sumner’s  memorandum  intrinsically  wrong  or  un- 
wise does  not  appear.  Nowhere,  it  may  be  af- 
firmed, does  it  appear,  from  Mr.  Adams  or  else- 
where, that  the  memorandum  of  January  17, 1871, 
was  really  anything  more  than  a politic,  reasonable, 
diplomatic  insistence,  at  the  stage  of  the  negotia- 
tions then  reached  and  under  the  then  existing  cir- 
cumstances, on  a policy  maturely  adopted  and  long 
pursued  both  by  Sumner  and  by  the  Administration. 
Still  less  does  it  appear  that  Grant  and  Fish,  in 
fact,  did  look  upon  the  memorandum,  or  would 
have  had  reason  for  looking  upon  it,  as  unexpected, 
or  obstructive,  or  embarrassing.  If  the  conditions 
set  forth  in  the  second  paragraph  of  the  memoran- 
dum should  prove  dangerous  or  obstructive,  it  might 
be  at  once  modified  or  withdrawn ; and  who  can 
reasonably  say  that  Sumner  would  not  have  readily 
withdrawn  his  insistence  or  opposition  whenever 
the  point  of  danger  had  been  reached  ? 

So  far,  then,  as  Grant  and  Fish  are  concerned, 
up  to  this  point  it  comes  to  just  this,  — that  Grant 
saw  in  Sumner’s  memorandum  nothing  but  a 
strategic  advantage  which  he  could  use  to  get 
^ Adams,  Before  and  After^  etc.,  119. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  27 


even”  with  Sumner;  and  Fish  saw  in  it  nothing 
new,  nothing  novel  or  unfamiliar,  nothing  unrea- 
sonable, — nothing,  in  fact,  but  a reaffirmation  of 
an  old  and  well-understood  policy  of  the  Adminis- 
tration. 

There  is  a phase  of  this  topic,  presented  by  Mr. 
Adams,  which  is  undoubtedly  new  to  the  public, 
and  not  a little  startling  in  its  character,  — the 
use  made  of  Sumner’s  memorandum  of  January  17, 
1871,  by  Fish.  Davis  had  told  the  public  that  it 
was  used  to  secure  Sumner’s  removal  in  the  Senate, 
being  privately  made  known  to  Senators,  — a state- 
ment which  — besides  involving,  if  true,  obliquity 
of  a rank  type  from  the  sense  of  justice  and  fair 
play,  in  making  a private  communication  intended 
to  injure  Sumner  and  giving  him  no  chance  to  re- 
ply or  explain  — seems,  as  we  have  seen,  to  lack 
proof  or  probability ; but  Mr.  Adams  now  informs 
us  that  Fish  handed  the  memorandum  on  J anuary 
24,  1871,  to  Sir  John  Rose.  After  the  latter  had 
read  it.  Fish  proceeded  to  inform  him  that  ‘‘  after 
full  consideration,  the  government  had  determined 
to  enter  on  the  proposed  negotiation  ; ” that  is,  the 
negotiation  outlined  or  formulated  in  the  memoran- 
dum submitted  to  Sumner  by  Fish,  January  15, 
1871,  and  to  which  Sumner’s  memorandum  of  Jan- 
uary 17,  1871,  was  a reply.  “ Should  Great  Brit- 
ain decide,”  added  Fish  to  Sir  John  Rose,  to 
send  out  envoys  to  treat  on  the  basis  agreed  upon, 
the  Administration  would  spare  no  effort  to  secure  ” 
— Mr.  Adams  here  quotes  — “ sl  favorable  result, 


28 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


even  if  it  involved  a conflict  with  the  Chairman  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  in  the  Sen- 
ate.” ^ Having  received  this  assurance,  Sir  John 
Rose  in  the  next  week  — such  was  the  intense  anx- 
iety of  his  government  to  get  a settlement  — was 
able  to  obtain  a notification  to  our  government  that 
the  English  government  would  send  a special  mission 
to  Washington  with  full  powers.  Matters  now 
moved  rapidly,  and  on  February  27,  1871,  seven 
weeks  only  after  the  arrival  of  Sir  John  Rose  in 
Washington,  the  Joint  High  Commission  for  the 
negotiation  of  a treaty  met  in  Washington,  and  on 
the  following  May  8th  the  Treaty  of  Washington 
was  signed. 

The  point  is  now  reached  where  comes  the  stress 
of  Mr.  Adams’s  defence  of  the  removal  of  Sumner. 
Stated  as  briefly  as  possible,  his  position  is,  that 
Fish  did  right  to  acquaint  Sir  John  Rose  and  the 
British  government  with  Sumner’s  memorandum, 
in  order  to  advise  that  government  of  the  possible 
danger  of  a failure  of  the  negotiations  through 
Sumner’s  opposition ; and  the  British  government 
having  decided  to  take  the  chances,  upon  the  pro- 
mise of  our  Administration  to  “ spare  no  effort  ” to 
overcome  opposition  on  Sumner’s  part,  that  the 
President  was  warranted,  indeed  bound,  to  secure 
the  removal  of  Sumner,  if  possible ; and  that  not 
to  have  done  so  “ would,”  in  Mr.  Adams’s  words, 
“ have  distinctly  savored  of  bad  faith  ” towards  the 
British  government.  Mr.  Adams  then  takes  the 
positions : — 

1 Adams,  Before  and  After,  etc.,  124. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  29 


(1)  that  in  the  conduct  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
country,  the  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  was  and  is  of  necessity  a part  of  the 
Administration;  ” ^ 

(2)  that  while  the  Executive  cannot  directly  inter- 
fere in  the  organization  of  the  legislative  body,  it  has  a 
perfect  right  to  demand  of  its  friends  and  supporters  in 
the  legislative  bodies  that  those  having  charge  through 
committees  of  the  business  of  those  bodies  shall  be  in  vir- 
tual harmony  with  the  Administration.”  ^ 

His  conclusion  from  these  premises  is  that  Grant 
was  justifiable  and  within  his  right  as  President  in 
influencing  and  procuring  the  removal  of  Sumner. 

Here  it  may  be  noticed  again  that  Mr.  Adams 
makes  quick  work  of  the  pretexts  and  excuses  of 
Davis  and  of  others  for  the  removal  both  of  Motley 
and  of  Sumner.  He  shortly  sets  down  the  removal 
of  the  former  as  due  to  Grant’s  wrath  at  Sumner ; 
and  the  removal  of  the  latter,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  as  due  to  a determination  reached  by  Grant 
‘‘quite  irrespective  of  the  fate  of  any  possible 
treaty.”  He  now,  however,  justifies  the  removal 
which  he  has  already  said  was  decided  upon  for 
reasons  “ quite  irrespective  of  the  fate  of  any  pos- 
sible treaty,”  on  the  grounds  just  above  stated,  (1) 
that  it  was  due  to  the  British  government,  which  had 
received  the  promise  of  the  overthrow  of  Sumner’s 
opposition,  if  possible,  and  (2)  that  the  President 
had  the  right  to  induce  or  require  the  Senate  to 
organize  its  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  in 

1 Adams,  Before  and  After ^ etc.,  127.  ^ Ibid.  116. 


30 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


harmony  with  the  Administration.  If  a slight 
shade  of  inconsistency  is  here  discernible  on  Mr. 
Adams’s  part,  in  first  ascribing  Sumner’s  removal 
to  Grant’s  determination  ‘‘  irrespective  of  the  fate 
of  any  possible  treaty,”  and  then  justifying  it  as 
due  to  his  promise  to  the  British  government,  the 
explanation  must  be  sought  from  Mr.  Adams,  not 
from  the  present  writer. 

Into  the  question  of  the  right,  propriety,  or  de- 
cency of  Fish’s  conduct,  in  exhibiting  Sumner’s 
memorandum  to  Sir  John  Eose,  and  through  him 
to  the  British  government  and  its  High  Commis- 
sioners, without  Sumner’s  consent  or  knowledge,  it 
is  not  proposed  here  to  enter.  If  looked  at  as  a 
matter  between  man  and  man  in  ordinary  life,  it 
would  undoubtedly  call  for  nothing  but  censure, 
if  not  execration.  Whether  in  the  present  case 
the  judgment  should  be  different,  it  is  not  essential 
to  discuss  here ; but  as  a companion  piece,  it  is 
perhaps  permissible  to  refer  to  Mr.  Adams’s  narra- 
tion of  another  incident  connected  with  Sumner’s 
removal  which,  it  is  believed,  has  not  hitherto  been 
known  to  many.  He  relates  that,  as  one  device 
for  getting  rid  of  both  Sumner  and  Motley  at  a 
stroke,  B.  F.  Butler  and  Simon  Cameron  proposed 
to  Fish  to  appoint  Sumner  to  succeed  Motley.  Mr. 
Adams  says  : — 

‘^This  suggestion  also  was  discussed  at  a Cabinet 
meeting,  and  the  President  expressed  a willingness  to 
make  the  nomination  on  condition  that  Sumner  would 
resign  from  the  Senate ; })ut  he  also  intimated  a grim 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  31 


determination  to  remove  him  from  his  new  office  as  soon 
as  he  had  been  confirmed  in  it^  ^ 

Upon  this  incident  Mr.  Adams  withholds  comment. 

The  inquiry  then  is,  finally,  whether  Grant’s  pro- 
mise, the  promise  of  the  Administration,  to  “ spare 
no  effort  ” to  overcome  Sumner’s  possible  opposi- 
tion, affords  a justification  of  Sumner’s  removal  ? 

First  of  all,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  in  point  of 
fact  Sumner  made  no  opposition  at  any  time  after 
January  17,  1871,  to  the  negotiation  of  the  Treaty 
of  Washington,  or  to  its  ratification  by  the  Senate, 
none  whatever.  On  the  contrary,  he  was  in  con- 
stant, cordial,  and  helpful  relations  with  the  High 
Commissioners  of  both  nations,  in  the  progress  of 
their  conferences  and  sittings  ending  in  the  treaty ; 
and  in  the  Senate  he  made  the  principal  speech  in 
support  of  the  treaty,  though  his  removal  had  been 
effected  two  months  previously ; and  he  voted  for 
its  ratification,  offering  several  amendments,  though 
not  pressing  them.^ 

Into  the  judgment  to  be  passed  upon  Sumner’s 
removal  must,  therefore,  enter  the  consideration 
that  he  was  in  fact  removed  before  he  had  made 
any  opposition,  or  given  hint  of  opposition,  be- 
yond the  memorandum  of  January  17,  1871 ; and 
that  he  did  in  fact,  at  every  subsequent  stage,  for- 
ward, to  the  extent  of  his  ability,  the  negotiation 

1 The  italics  here  are  the  present  writer’s.  Adams,  Before  and 
After ^ etc.,  95. 

2 Pierce,  Memoir  and  Betters  of  Sumner^  iv.  488-491. 


32 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


and  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  What  ground, 
it  is  imperative  now  to  ask,  connected  with  the 
memorandum  of  January  17,  1871,  can  be  found 
for  the  justification  of  Sumner’s  removal  ? Recall 
the  situation.  For  a long  time  prior  to  January  15, 
1871,  Sumner  and  the  Administration  represented 
by  Grant  and  Fish  had  held  to  the  policy  of  ‘‘  a 
comprehensive  settlement  of  our  whole  grievance 
with  England  by  a voluntary,  peaceful  cession  of 
Canada,  a policy  actually  and  repeatedly  discussed 
by  Fish  and  Thornton,  and  one  specially  satisfac- 
tory and  attractive  to  Grant.  Mr.  Adams  makes  all 
this  very  clear.  Suddenly  this  policy  is  dropped, 
and  Fish  presents  Sumner  with  a wholly  new 
programme,  of  which  Sumner  could  have  had  no 
previous  knowledge.  Sumner,  after  deliberation, 
reiterates  the  former  policy,  but  without  any  in- 
timation of  a purpose  to  push  it  obstinately  or  to 
the  point  of  danger.  Thereafter  Sumner,  probably 
perceiving  that  the  abandonment  of  its  policy  by 
the  Administration  had  made  further  insistence  un- 
wise or  impracticable,  makes  no  opposition  of  any 
kind  to  the  carrying  out  of  the  new  policy  of  the 
Administration.  What  cause  or  warrant  now  re- 
mained for  interference  with  Sumner  in  his  chair- 
manship ? The  President’s  promise  to  spare  no 
effort  ” to  overcome  his  opposition  ? But  he  had 
made,  was  making,  or  hinting  at  making,  no  oppo- 
sition. He  might  yet  do  so?  But  would  it  not  be 
soon  enough  to  attack  him  when  he  gave  sign  of 
opposition  or  obstruction?  On  March  10,  1871, 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  33 


when  Sumner  was  removed  by  the  Senate,  he  had 
given  no  sign  of  obstructing,  or  wishing  to  ob- 
struct, the  progress  of  negotiations  for  a treaty 
which  toere  then  under  full  headway.  Did 
Grant’s  promise  to  spare  no  effort  ” to  overcome 
Sumner’s  opposition  require  him,  under  these  cir- 
cumstances, to  anticipate  opposition  from  Sumner, 
and  proceed  at  once  to  procure  his  removal  ? No 
one  can  pretend  this. 

But  another  question.  Suppose  Sumner  should 
oppose  the  treaty ; was  it  necessary  to  remove  him 
from  his  chairmanship  in  order  to  overcome  his 
opposition  ? Could  he  not  be  quietly  outvoted  at 
every  point  when  the  treaty  came  before  the  Sen- 
ate? His  removal  was,  as  Mr.  Adams  is  well 
within  the  truth  in  saying,  almost  without  prece- 
dent.” It  was  at  best  and  admittedly  an  extreme 
measure.  Its  accomplishment  was  a difficult  task 
even  for  the  man  of  Donelson,  of  Vicksburg,  and 
of  Appomattox,”  with  all  his  then  overshadowing 
prestige.  On  test  votes  in  the  caucus,  the  op- 
ponents of  Sumner  had  the  slight  majorities  of  only 
five  and  two,  the  normal  Kepublican  majority  then 
in  the  Senate  being  nearly  fifty.  Is  it  not  impos- 
sible to  say,  in  view  of  this  record,  that  it  was 
necessary  to  remove  Sumner,  even  if  he  had  con- 
tinued the  most  strenuous  opposition  to  the  treaty  ? 
His  opposition  could  have  been  overcome  in  a far 
easier  and  not  less  effective  way. 

Mr.  Adams  urges  that  Sumner  could,  as  Chair- 
man of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Kela- 


34 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


tions,  have  defeated  the  ratification  of  the  treaty. 
He  says : — 

^^That  Mr.  Sumner,  had  he,  on  consideration,  con- 
cluded that  it  was  his  duty  to  oppose  the  confirmation  of 
the  treaty,  could,  placed  as  he  now  was  {i,  e.,  removed 
as  chairman),  have  secured  its  rejection  is  not  probable. 
As  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  it 
would  almost  unquestionably  have  been  in  his  power  so 
to  do  ; not  directly,  perhaps,  but  through  the  adoption 
of  plausible  amendments.”  ^ 

This  is  certainly  an  opinion  for  which  reasons 
not  given  by  Mr.  Adams  are  needed.  Plausible 
amendments  ? ” Could  plausible  amendments,  or 
amendments  of  any  sort,  eseape  the  notice  of  other 
Senators,  or  be  passed  over  their  opposition  ? 
Would  Grant  and  Fish  have  slept  while  Sumner 
in  the  Senate  undid  all  their  work  by  plausible 
amendments  ? This  suggestion  of  Mr.  Adams 
scarcely  calls  for  notice. 

The  present  paper  cannot  well  be  closed  without 
some  reference  to  Mr.  Adams’s  positions ; (1)  that 
‘‘  the  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  For- 
eign Relations  was  and  is  of  necessity  a part  of 
the  Administration ; ” and  (2)  that  the  Executive 
Department  has  ‘‘  a perfect  right  to  demand  of  its 
friends  and  supporters  ” in  the  Senate  that  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  “ shall  be  in  vir- 
tual harmony  with  the  Administration.”  These  are 
surely  grave  propositions.  They  deserve  notice. 

1 Adams,  Before  and  After ^ etc.,  131. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  35 


The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  provides 
that  the  President  shall  have  power,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  by  a two- 
thirds  vote,  to  make  treaties.  This  provision 
must  have  suggested,  it  is  assumed,  Mr.  Adams’s 
positions. 

Merely  remarking  here,  in  passing,  that  the  more 
correct  statement  of  Mr.  Adams’s  idea  would  seem 
to  be,  that  the  Senate  itself,  the  whole  Senate, 
each  and  every  Senator,  — not  alone  the  Chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  — is  a 
part  of  the  Administration ; it  is  now  to  be  said 
that  the  constitutional  provision  in  question,  as  the 
contemporaneous  history  shows  and  as  all  authorities 
hold,  was  put  in  its  present  form  as  a distinct  check 
upon  the  power  of  the  President.  It  was  intended 
to  place  the  separate  and  independent  power  to  ap- 
prove or  reject  treaties  in  the  hands  of  another  de- 
positary than  the  President.  The  Senate’s  power 
over  treaties,  when  negotiated  and  sent  to  the 
Senate,  is  as  substantive  and  independent  as  that 
of  the  President  in  negotiating  them.  To  say, 
then,  that  the  Senate  is  a part  of  the  treaty-making 
power  under  our  government  is  to  speak  accu- 
rately; but  on  what  theory  or  ground  can  the 
Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  be  said  to  be,  in  any  sense,  a part  of 
the  Administration  ? ” The  Administration  is  the 
President  and  his  official  advisers  or  assistants,  the 
Cabinet  officers.  Or,  in  its  broadest  scope,  the 
Administration  is  only  the  executive  department 


36 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


of  the  government.  The  Chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  is  not  a Cabinet 
officer,  is  not  appointed  by  the  President,  does  not 
hold  at  the  pleasure  of  the  President,  is  not  answer- 
able  or  amenable  in  any  particular  to  the  President ; 
nor  is  he,  nor  is  the  Senate,  nor  any  part  or  member 
of  the  Senate,  a part  of  the  executive  department 
of  the  government.  How,  then,  can  the  Chairman 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  be, 
in  any  sense,  a “ part  of  the  Administration  ” ? 
The  Senate,  as  a legislative  body,  is  part  of  the 
legislative  department  of  our  government,  but  as 
such,  it  is  strictly  coordinate  with,  not  a part  of, 
any  other  department  of  the  government.  To 
make  it,  or  the  Chairman  of  its  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  a part  of  the  Administration  in 
any  sense,  is  to  make  it  or  the  Chairman  of  its 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  subordinate  to, 
and  not  coordinate  with,  another  department  of  the 
government,  — an  untenable  and  inadmissible  pro- 
position on  its  face.  Coordination  is  one  thing; 
subordination  is  another  thing.  Coordination,  or 
even  cooperation,  between  two  departments  of  the 
government,  is  admissible,  is  provided  for,  and  con- 
stantly takes  place,  as  in  the  case  now  under  con- 
sideration, of  treaty-making;  but  subordination, 
subjection,  control  over,  one  department  or  any 
part  of  one  department  by  another  department, 
or  by  an  officer  of  another  department,  is  opposed 
to  any  correct  conception  of  the  frame  of  our  gov- 
ernment. All  this  is  plain  to  a demonstration. 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  37 


Not  only  is  this  true  as  to  the  frame  of  our 
government,  the  intention  of  its  framers,  and  the 
uniform  working  and  interpretation  of  our  Consti- 
tution, but  it  is  plainly  the  dictate  or  demand  of 
reason  and  the  public  safety.  It  is  the  undoubted, 
solemn  duty  of  the  Senate  and  of  all  its  individual 
members  — no  duty  is  more  binding  — to  preserve 
and  exercise  at  all  times  a free,  independent,  un- 
constrained judgment  on  all  questions  requiring 
the  judgment  or  action  of  the  Senate.  Neither 
the  Senate  as  one  body  nor  any  subdivision  of  that 
body,  nor  any  individual  member  of  that  body, 
owes  the  least  duty  of  obedience  or  subordination 
to  the  President  or  to  the  Administration.  No 
greater  indignity  to  a Senator  in  his  official  charac- 
ter can  be  imagined  than  to  seek  to  lower  him  to 
the  position  of  one  subject  to  the  behest  of  a Presi- 
dent or  an  Administration,  or  to  regard  him  as 
holding  his  position  in  the  Senate,  or  exercising 
any  senatorial  function,  to  any  extent,  at  the 
pleasure  or  will  of  the  President  or  the  Adminis- 
tration. If  nothing  else  is  clear  or  certain  in  this 
discussion,  it  is  clear  and  certain  that  no  Senator 
can  be,  in  any  possible  sense  or  relation,  a part  of 
the  Administration.” 

Equally  clear  is  it,  for  like  reasons,  that  the 
President  has  no  right  or  business  to  interfere  in 
the  Senate  by  way  of  urgency,  pressure,  or  influ- 
ence, or  in  any  manner  which  affects,  or  is  calcu- 
lated to  affect,  the  perfect  freedom  of  action  of  the 
Senate,  or  of  a Senator,  in  any  matter  committed 


38 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


by  law  to  the  action  and  judgment  of  the  Senate. 
Such  interference  rises  high  above  the  degree  of 
an  impropriety,  and  becomes  a wrong,  a true  out- 
rage upon  the  official  and  personal  rights,  privi- 
leges, and  dignity  of  the  Senate  and  of  all  its 
members.  Such  must  be  the  verdict  upon  any  con- 
duct of  Grant  or  Fish,  or  of  any  one  directed  or 
inspired  by  them  who  sought  the  removal  of  Sum- 
ner by  any  pressure  or  influence  or  insistence 
which  interfered  with,  or  which  was  designed  or 
suited  to  interfere  with,  the  perfectly  free  judg- 
ment and  action  of  any  Senator  or  of  the  Senate, 
or  with  the  perfectly  independent  organization  of 
the  Senate  and  of  its  committees  for  the  transaction 
of  its  business. 

One  of  the  least  valid,  therefore,  of  the  defences 
yet  made  of  Sumner’s  removal  under  the  circum- 
stances of  its  occurrence  in  1871,  is  the  claim  of 
Mr.  Adams  that  the  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  ‘‘  was  and  is  a part  of 
the  Administration,”  and  as  such  that  it  was  the 
right  of  the  President  to  require  Sumner’s  removal, 
and  the  duty  of  the  Senate  to  make  it. 

It  seems  only  necessary,  in  concluding,  to  say 
that  after  thorough  reexamination  and  full  consid- 
eration of  all  the  available  sources  of  information 
and  of  all  previous  discussions,  including  especially 
the  present  address  of  Mr.  Adams,  the  conclusion 
is  clear,  — that  the  cause  of  Sumner’s  removal  was 
precisely  and  only  what  Carl  Schurz  and  Henry 


AND  THE  TREATY  OF  WASHINGTON  39 


Wilson  at  the  time  declared  it  to  be.  Said  Mr. 
Schurz : “ The  San  Domingo  scheme  was  at  the 
bottom  of  the  whole  difficulty ; ” and  he  pro- 
nounced the  absence  of  personal  relations  between 
Grant  and  Fish  and  Sumner  “ a flimsy  pretext ! ” 
Said  Henry  Wilson  : — 

‘‘  Sir,  the  truth  is,  and  everybody  knows  it,  and  it  is 
useless  for  the  Senator  from  Wisconsin,  or  any  other 
Senator,  to  deny  it,  that  this  proposition  to  remove  my 
colleague  grows  out  of  the  San  Domingo  question.  If 
there  had  never  been  an  effort  to  annex  San  Domingo, 
we  should  have  had  no  attempt  to  change  the  chairman- 
ship of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  or  to  remove 
members  from  that  committee.  . . . The  people  of  the 
country,  say  what  you  may  about  it,  will  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  at  the  bottom  of  it  all  lies  this  San  Do- 
mingo annexation  question.”  ^ 

And  the  final  conclusion  is,  that  no  cause  has 
yet  been  shown  which  does  not  leave  the  removal 
of  Sumner  where  the  public  has  hitherto  placed  it, 
— among  the  most  unwarrantable,  grossly  unjust, 
and  inexcusable  acts  ever  committed  in  our  politi- 
cal history. 


Charles  Sumner,  throughout  a long  career,  ever 
clear  in  his  great  office,”  served  Massachusetts 
and  the  nation,  his  generation  and  his  age,  with 
unsurpassed  fidelity.  Not  without  some  conceded 
limitations  and  foibles,  it  may  yet  be  affirmed  that 
1 Pierce,  Memoir  and  Letters  of  Sumner^  iv.  473. 


40 


CHARLES  SUMNER 


the  roll  of  American  statesmen  bears  the  name  of 
no  one  who,  on  the  whole,  worked  for  the  welfare  of 
the  whole  country  and  of  all  races  of  men  more 
constantly,  more  faithfully,  or  more  successfully. 
It  was  his  lot,  late  in  life,  to  feel  the  slings  and 
arrows  of  outrageous  fortune.”  He  never  quailed 
or  faltered  in  the  hard  way  which  he  was  called  to 
follow.  Sitting  now  in  the  peace  and  quiet  of 
later  days,  the  present  writer  will  perhaps  be  par- 
doned if  he  confesses  that  he  has  felt  the  force  of 
the  closing  words  of  Carlyle’s  “ Life  of  John  Ster- 
ling.” Why  defend  Charles  Sumner ? “I  im- 
agine I had  a higher  commission  than  the  world’s, 
the  dictate  of  Nature  herself,  to  do  what  is  now 
done.” 


Ft;':  ^ 

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V 


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